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THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
RESUMEN: Este artículo aborda diversos aspectos clave de la ges-
tión ambiental en el mundo en desarrollo desde la perspectiva de la 
ecología política. Comienza con un breve repaso de la evolución de la 
ecología política. Posteriormente se abordan dos casos de estudio en 
el Sudeste de Asia con el fin de explorar espacios de confrontación y 
espacios de cooperación que aglutinan elementos clave de la historia 
y la actualidad de la gestión ambiental en el mundo en desarrollo. 
En este proceso el artículo concluye que las multifacéticos políticas 
de transacción que tienen lugar en el mundo no pueden ser trans-
formadas simplemente a través de apolíticas llamadas a “salvar la 
naturaleza”.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Ecología política, mundo en desarrollo, ges-
tión ambiental, espacios de confrontación y cooperación, Burma, 
Filipinas.
ABSTRACT: This paper addresses selected aspects of environmental 
management in the developing world through the prism of a political 
ecology perspective. It begins with a brief overview of the evolution 
of political ecology. It then turns to two case studies from South-
East Asia in order to explore spaces of confrontation and spaces of 
cooperation – spaces that encompass key elements of historical and 
contemporary environmental management in the developing world. 
In the process, the paper underlines the multifaceted politics of tran-
saction that takes place in a world that can never be transformed 
simply through apolitical calls to “save nature”.
KEY WORDS: Political ecology, developing world, environmental 
management, spaces of confrontation and cooperation, Burma, 
Philippines.
INTRODUCTION
No amount of wishful thinking by journalists, academ-
ics, celebrity environmentalists or other “do-gooders” will 
change one basic fact about human-environmental rela-
tions in the modern era: they are everywhere and always 
deeply politicised. The monumental violence and misery 
that humans have heaped on each other over time is in-
escapably etched on the biophysical environment – indeed, 
to the extent that it is socially constructed in ways that 
reflect unequal power relations. The spectacle of rich and 
famous people singing before a worldwide audience (as in 
London in July 2006) in order to “Save the Planet” reflects 
but does not alter this situation.
A political ecology approach seeks to understand environ-
mental management in the developing world (an awkward 
label encompassing Africa, Asia and Latin America simply 
used for convenience here) by confronting its deadly 
nature. It does so not out of a sense of despair but argu-
ably rather from a sense of hope – hope based on deeply 
ingrained scepticism about the motives of the powerful 
as well as a realisation that moves toward an ecologi-
cally sustainable and equitable future is predicated on 
the unflinching analysis of hurdles that first need to be 
surmounted.
This paper thus seeks to address selected aspects of envi-
ronmental management in the developing world through 
the prism of political ecology. It first provides a brief over-
view of the development of the field of political ecology. 
It then turns to two case studies from South-East Asia 
in order to explore spaces of confrontation and spaces 
of cooperation that are believed to comprise important 
elements of the historical and contemporary dynamics 
of environmental management in the developing world 
(even while recognising that these elements are hardly 
“representative” of the great diversity of processes at play 
in such a vast entity). In the process, the paper underlines 
the multifaceted politics of transaction that takes place 
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in a world that can never be transformed simply through 
“apolitical” calls to “save nature” – as if such a call was 
somehow detachable from the messy politics that has got 
nature “into trouble” in the first place.
LOCATING POLITICAL ECOLOGY
Political ecology began life in the 1970s as a multi-disci-
plinary research field located at the juncture of anthro-
pology and geography. Its origins lay in the analysis of 
rural areas of the developing world (or “Third World”) and 
reflected deep disquiet about politically mainstream ex-
planations of social and environmental change. Drawing 
on Marxism and dependency theories, scholars repudiated 
“neo-Malthusian” accounts that blamed environmental 
problems on runaway population growth among the poor 
(for overviews of political ecology, see Bryant and Bailey 
1997; Watts 2000; Forsyth 2003; Robbins 2004). Instead, 
they put forward class-based analyses that emphasised 
structural political and economic inequalities at the heart 
of colonial and post-colonial capitalist relations that 
drained money and natural resources away from “periph-
eral” developing countries to “core” developed countries 
even as this process left local communities in the former 
highly vulnerable to recurrent “natural” hazards such as 
droughts and floods.
Marxist political ecology thus combined a preoccupation 
with the global capitalist system, the structural subordina-
tion of the “Third World” as a key part of that system, and 
the oppressiveness of class inequalities notably manifested 
in the form of highly unequal peasant-landlord agrarian 
relations. Major works of this period (which stretched 
from the 1970s through the late 1980s) included Piers 
Blaikie’s (1985) landmark study on “the political economy 
of soil erosion”, Michael Watts’ (1983) historically based 
dissection of rural class relations in Nigeria, and Stephen 
Bunker’s (1985) exhilarating juxtaposition of dependency 
and energetics theories to explain “underdevelopment in 
the Amazon”. In this and other work, there was an effort 
to transcend prior work through a neo-Marxist “progres-
sive contextualization” (or the move from looking solely 
at local biophysical changes to national and global social 
and economic causes and dynamics, see Vayda 1983). The 
strength of this approach was that it offered scholars a 
way to make sense of the power of “non-place-based” 
actors (such as trans-national corporations) over “place-
based” actors (such as small-scale farmers). By combining 
an anthropological understanding of localities with neo-
Marxism’s stress on class and developing world depend-
ency on the developed world, writers sought to forge 
a truly political ecology approach to environment and 
development issues.
By the early 1990s, a new generation of scholars had 
become impatient with the economic “fixation” of early 
political ecology. In part, criticism reflected a widely 
perceived “impasse” in neo-Marxism – notably that it 
neglected to take seriously either the biophysical environ-
ment or non-economic issues (Booth 1994). In part, too, 
it reflected the concomitant rise of post-structural and 
post-Marxist thinking (linked to the likes of Foucault and 
Weber) which stressed more overtly political explanation. 
In practice, theoretical eclecticism was the order of the 
day – while some sought to “bring the State back in” oth-
ers promoted a “feminist political ecology”, while others 
still emphasised discourse analysis. The result was a field 
invigorated by much debate over the pathways and merits 
of the “post-structural turn” even as it led to (justified) 
complaints about a “lack of theoretical coherence” (Peet 
and Watts 1996).
Since the turn of the millennium, political ecology has 
continued to expand both in terms of the number of 
practitioners and in the array of topics and perspectives 
that it now encompasses (Forsyth 2003; Robbins 2004; 
Neumann 2005). In the process, it has continued to probe 
ever more deeply into the complex dimensions and proper-
ties of “politicised environments” in which state and non-
state actors interact over time and space and according 
to material and discursive imperatives. I now turn to the 
more detailed consideration of how such environments are 
intimately associated with both spaces of confrontation 
and cooperation.
SPACES OF CONFRONTATION: TEAK AND THE BUILDING
OF BURMA
Political ecology is centrally concerned about the study of 
confrontation among actors seeking to manage the bio-
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As Anglo-Burmese relations deteriorated the British set 
their sights on the acquisition of Tenasserim – a coastal 
strip of land that was at the periphery of the Burmese 
Empire yet rich in teak. Following the first Anglo-Burmese 
war, the British set about exploiting the Tenasserim forests 
with timber firms pursuing cut-and-run policies in the ab-
sence of regulation. These forests were all but exhausted 
by the 1850s and the attention of firms thus shifted to 
the teak-bearing Pegu Yoma (or hills) of southern Burma 
still then under monarchical rule.
The second Anglo-Burmese war marked a more aggressive 
stage in British imperialism as Burma began to be seen 
as part of the British Indian Empire. Valuable teak forests 
were again an important consideration. On the one hand, 
fears that unregulated extraction would simply repeat the 
disaster in Tenasserim thereby leaving Britain without 
adequate supplies provided one justification for war. On 
the other hand, when the war was concluded, British of-
ficials ensured that much of the Pegu Yoma was included 
in British-ruled areas (Pollack 1979). Such teak diplomacy 
was followed by the promotion of long-term exploitation 
under a forest department specifically created for this task 
in 1856 (Brandis 1859; Nisbet 1901).
And yet, once again, British military conquest did not 
result in the capture of the key teak forests that were 
north of the new border, along the Chindwin River and in 
the Shan States. Firms led by the British-owned Bombay 
Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL) had already 
begun to snap up timber leases from a financially impov-
erished Burmese monarchy in 1862. Subsequent claims 
that the latter was sanctioning widespread deforestation 
(as well as an “unfair” fine imposed on the BBTCL by 
King Thebaw) provided a pretext for war (Geary 1886; 
Keeton 1974). For the British, it was important to seize 
upper Burma’s teak forests before they were exhausted 
through “misuse” – ironically at a time when most forests 
in British-ruled lower Burma had already been cleared 
for permanent agriculture (Adas 1983). This calculation, 
when combined with fears over French designs on Burma, 
provided the basis for the third Anglo-Burmese war (Chew 
1979).
In this way, British business and the British-Indian govern-
ment brought Burma’s teak forests – and with them the 
country itself – firmly into the British sphere. This process 
physical environment. It has thus stressed the contested 
nature of environmental management – nowhere more so 
than in work on the developing world.
A key concern has been to assess the spatial interaction 
of states as they struggle over strategically important 
resources. The quest for oil, natural gas, timber, minerals 
and other resources remains a fertile source of conflict. 
Looming resource scarcities are only liable to intensify 
this situation. Teak has long played a role in this saga in 
a process that shaped not only how Burma – home to the 
world’s best teak forests – related to other countries but 
also how other countries related to it. The resource that 
helped put Burma on the international map is also linked 
to economic policies of introversion and/or selective open-
ing that have underpinned the image of Asia’s “pariah” 
state. Attention to this case study is therefore useful to 
illustrate more generally how spaces of confrontation are 
created and with what ramifications.
If teak production helped to establish pre-colonial Burma 
as an important nation in regional flows of natural re-
sources and wealth by the late eighteenth century, grow-
ing European (especially British) interest in the country 
helped to catapult Burma to the forefront of imperial geo-
politics thereafter. Over a tumultuous sixty-year period, it 
was a prime focus of imperial action as the country was 
forcibly incorporated into the British-Indian Empire. The 
geopolitical fault line shifted in three stages as Britain 
seized successive portions of the country as a result of 
winning three wars: the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-
26), the second Anglo-Burmese war (1852), and the third 
Anglo-Burmese war (1885-86).
In each case, the imperial quest for teak played a role in 
shaping the move to war and the subsequent contours of 
empire. Thus, looming timber shortages associated with 
the depletion of oak supplies prompted British interest in 
Burma’s plentiful teak forests in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. A key problem from the British viewpoint was that the 
annual teak supply from monarchical Burma was erratic 
at a time when the British navy was demanding a reli-
able supply of timber for its shipyards in Calcutta (Pollack 
1979). If the reasons for this supply problem varied over 
time – shifts in royal policy, domestic timber consumption, 
internal political battles, and so on – the result was an 
unacceptable state of affairs for the British.
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was as bloody as it was disruptive of pre-existing land 
and forest management among the people who depended 
on the forests. In the years that followed, the geopolitical 
dimensions and implications of the nineteenth century An-
glo-Burmese conflict became clearer and were to prove 
remarkably durable.
Aside from formally defining the eastern edge of the Brit-
ish Empire in continental South-East Asia (until 1947), 
the Anglo-Burmese conflict led to a sharper definition of 
the territory of “Burma”. Profound political and ecological 
implications followed from this territorial strategy that 
helped to shape both the internal and external policy envi-
ronment as political power assumed a specific spatial form 
(cf. Storey 2001). In the process, Burmese environmental 
management has been played out in a geopolitical context 
itself that had been shaped by the quest for teak.
Two implications can be noted here. First, as the idea of 
Burma took shape under the British, that idea was linked 
to the notion that the country was a “natural” producer 
of abundant natural resources. As a world-leading rice 
exporter, Burma was also the world’s key source of teak 
as well as being home to a variety of precious minerals in-
cluding jade. The country thus became indelibly associated 
with the extraction of natural resources – its “free gift of 
nature” (Furnivall 1909). Second, as fixed borders replaced 
zones of influence, Burma’s relations with its neighbors 
(notably Siam/Thailand, China and India) followed a new 
course even as old patterns of timber extraction and mi-
gration posed a challenge to regional relations. “Arbitrary” 
national borders did not necessarily mesh with pre-exist-
ing timber extraction routes let alone the migratory pat-
terns and extended kin relationships of shifting cultivators 
and others who lived in the new border areas (Thongchai 
Winichakul 1994). Cross-border discontinuities were ex-
acerbated by the practice of “divide and rule” whereby 
core Burman-dominated areas were under direct British 
rule while peripheral areas were subject to indirect rule 
via British-sanctioned hereditary local rulers (Taylor 1987). 
Peripheral autonomy among Burma’s “ethnic minorities” 
under the British became a major bone of contention in the 
post-colonial era and intersected in complicated ways with 
center-periphery relations in neighboring countries.
Postcolonial Burma’s geopolitical relations have continued 
to be shaped by teak-related concerns elaborated during 
the pre-colonial and colonial eras. One difference from 
the colonial era at least has been the Burmese practice of 
geopolitical introversion (albeit, combined with sporadic 
and selective opening) behind a “teak curtain” (Thawng-
mung 2004).
Geopolitical introversion was taken to an extreme after a 
coup d’etat in March 1962 brought General Ne Win and 
other military commanders to power. Between independ-
ence (January 4, 1948) and the 1962 coup, teak revenue 
had played a role in underpinning the Rangoon-based 
democratic government led by U Nu even though revenue 
was severely limited due to pervasive violence in the for-
ests. After 1962, teak revenue became ever more crucial 
to the fortunes of the Ne Win ruled state. Thus, whereas 
in 1951-52 teak exports accounted for only 4 per cent 
of the value of total exports (mainly rice and minerals) 
by 1970 that figure was 25 per cent (Trager 1954: 26; 
Steinberg 1981: 117). By 1984-85 the figure was 27.4 per 
cent but soared thereafter to as much as 42 per cent of 
the country’s total official exports by value (Ministry of 
Planning and Finance 1985: 107; Smith 1991: 5; figures 
are estimates).
And yet, two things can be noted in relation to the post-
1962 politics of Burma’s teak management. First, teak 
revenue provided a financial lifeline for a state beset 
by multiple insurgencies. Indeed, it was a key means by 
which the Ne Win regime mounted successful offensives 
against its foes (Smith 1999). Second, teak exports pro-
vided one of the few connections between Burma and the 
rest of the world during the Burmese Way to Socialism 
(1962-88). A powerful State Timber Board oversaw this 
trade and associated extraction and was answerable to 
Ne Win and associates (Forestal International 1978). In 
effect, teak earnings enabled the Burmese State to fash-
ion a quasi-autarchy involving minimal political, economic 
and cultural links to the outside world in a classic case of 
geopolitical introversion.
Following the popular upheaval and brutal military crack-
down of 1988, the military junta known as the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) shifted tack in a 
process in which timber exports (including teak) loomed 
large. The regime had little choice. On the one hand, the 
SLORC-ruled Burmese State was branded an international 
pariah by Western countries suddenly attentive to this 
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“hermit state”. On the other hand, a small but influential 
Burmese diaspora in Europe, North America and Australia 
campaigned actively against the SLORC and in favor of 
the imprisoned Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi – the 
winner of the country’s only free and fair election held in 
a generation. The response by the SLORC was to develop 
links with its Asian neighbors – especially Thailand and 
China – using Burma’s abundant natural resources (includ-
ing teak) as a bargaining chip.
The political, economic and ecological details of the post-
1988 period in which Burma’s military rulers embarked 
on an aggressive strategy of resource geopolitics are well 
documented (Geary 1994; WRI 1998; Global Witness 
2003). Three things need to be highlighted about this 
process here. First, SLORC resource geopolitics ushered in 
a new and bloodier phase in the country’s civil war as it 
fought its opponents with growing success. Teak and other 
resource earnings were vital as they enabled the SLORC 
to upgrade the capability of the army (tatmadaw) with 
improved weaponry bought from China. From the vantage 
of the SLORC, the teak/natural resource-military hardware 
nexus proved to be a virtuous cycle since acquisition of 
the latter enabled it to conquer more and more insurgent 
territory opening up profitable new extraction activities 
for the tatmadaw. For villagers caught in the midst of 
battles that raged across the country, consequences were 
devastating.
Second, SLORC resource geopolitics was about working to 
realign the political and economic interests of key neigh-
bors such that they would become partners of the regime. 
In return for lucrative teak and other natural resource 
deals, Burma’s leaders hoped to win the support of neigh-
bors in debates over Burma held in the United Nations and 
other fora (e.g. ASEAN). The key players were Thailand (and 
ASEAN) as well as China and support was won through a 
process of exploiting regional rivalries. Such resource-re-
lated diplomacy led to closer ties with Thailand and other 
ASEAN countries (leading to Burma even joining the latter 
organization in 1997) and the opening up of the frontier 
between Burma and China as trade between these two sets 
of relations boomed (Geary 1994; Global Witness 2003).
Third, and related to this last point, SLORC resource 
geopolitics enabled the regime to neutralize the interna-
tional influence of the Burmese opposition that had been 
a threat to it in the late 1980s. While that opposition has 
enjoyed support in Europe, North America and Australia, 
it has been less influential in Asian countries that matter 
to the SLORC: China, Japan and the ASEAN nations. Thus, 
Burma’s poor human rights record since 1988 (it was bad 
before but less known) has prompted campaigns including 
boycotts against companies that work with the regime. 
Yet, the lack of international consensus – undermined 
by China, Japan and Thailand – ensured that the SLORC 
(now, State Peace and Development Council) has not felt 
political pressure in the way that other “pariah” states 
have (Seekins 1992; Global Witness 2003).
How teak geopolitics has directly led to battles for control 
of the teak forests is central to the spatial politics of Bur-
mese environmental management. Resource militarization 
has long been associated with the quest for teak through 
a process that has produced a “violent environment” in 
which many lives have been blighted (cf. Peluso and Watts 
2001). True, forest violence is not only associated with that 
quest – other resources have been at stake (such as tin 
and jade). Further, violence has also often been motivated 
by non-resource-related objectives, notably the crushing 
of opposition to the state (Smith 1999).
And yet, it would be odd indeed if economic incentives 
that influenced the geopolitics of British imperialism in 
the nineteenth century, and the geopolitics of regional 
trade in the late twentieth century did not have a major 
impact on the people who dwelt in the teak forests. In 
practice, that impact was often quite negative in terms of 
peoples’ livelihoods and safety. Here, I examine resource 
militarization to underscore how the production of violent 
environments was part-and-parcel of the “scientific” man-
agement of teak forests.
Resource militarization reflected various processes even 
as it held diverse implications for forest dwellers. The 
transformation of the teak forests into violent environ-
ments was a variable process. Still, it was often associ-
ated with the politics of inter-ethnic strife and state 
versus opposition group conflict. The details are complex 
(see Taylor 1987; Smith 1999), so an overview will suf-
fice here.
Teak forests have been hotspots in the long-standing 
production of violent environments. Indeed, they have 
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long been home to those opposed to lowland rulers – “a 
traditional hiding-place for malcontents” (Foucar 1956: 
72). Historical and contemporary accounts abound with 
descriptions of “bandits”, “banditry” and battles in the for-
est as weaker protagonists retreated to areas into which 
powerful political groups were at a tactical disadvantage 
due to the terrain (Mills 1979; Adas 1982). A case in 
point occurred in the 1930s as the Hsaya San rebellion 
was centered on the teak-bearing Pegu Yoma and took 
the British years to quell (Maung Maung 1976). In other 
cases, “banditry” was more “home-grown”, as residents 
mobilized against outsiders intent on disrupting their 
livelihoods – the Burma forest department was a focal 
point of such resistance. Clearly, the circumstances and 
protagonists varied over space and time. However, the 
capture of teak logs in the forest was a favored practice. 
As forests became “bandit country”, though, residents were 
ensnared in fighting even though many were non-combat-
ants. Violence and uncertainty was the norm as teak logs 
were seized in an opportunistic fashion.
Teak forests were also the focus of systematic military 
strategizing by well-organized insurgent armies intent 
on capturing an important source of revenue. The most 
notable case concerned the long-running insurgency by 
Karen and other ethnic minorities against the Burman-
controlled state that began soon after independence was 
attained in 1948 (Smith 1999; Global Witness 2003). In-
deed, the fifty-year struggle by the Karen National Union 
(KNU) to establish Kawthoolei – a sovereign state of the 
Karen along the Thai-Burmese border – was partly reli-
ant on teak revenue. This dependency was greatest after 
the 1960s as KNU forces were pushed back to the border 
by the tatmadaw. By the 1980s the KNU was even more 
reliant on such revenue to underpin the insurgency and a 
flourishing trade with Thai partners ensued (Falla 1991; 
Bryant 1997).
Still, the greatest impetus to resource militarization was 
the effort by successive rulers of the Burmese State to 
assert control over the teak forests. In pre-colonial times, 
this ability was limited. However, a series of organizational 
and technological innovations in colonial and post-colo-
nial times meant that rulers since the mid-nineteenth 
century have often achieved greater forest control than 
before. In particular, the combination of modern arma-
ments and systematic forest knowledge (courtesy of the 
forest department) were a boon for British and Burmese 
leaders keen to exploit the forests to the hilt (Adas 1982; 
Selth 1996; Bryant 1997).
Even then, teak exploitation was not easy. Central control 
was highly contingent and involved much danger for of-
ficials caught in the line of fire. The level of violence fluc-
tuated over time. However, political upheaval and social 
unrest – especially in the late colonial (1920-1946) and 
post-colonial eras (since 1947) – were associated with 
extreme violence in the forests. Not surprisingly, state ef-
forts to extract teak resembled a military campaign. Forest 
officials and/or private lessees would enter the forest only 
with armed escorts – sometimes to the dismay of foresters 
afraid that these escorts were “merely a succulent bait for 
the large bands of well- armed rebels roaming the coun-
try” (BOF 1946). In the mid-1950s, the U Nu government 
mounted a large-scale military operation – code named 
“Operation Teak” – in insurgent “infested” southern Burma. 
Units of the tatmadaw secured the banks of the Sittang 
River between Toungoo and Rangoon and provided river 
escorts for the rafts. Timber was rafted from the forests to 
Rangoon thereby earning the government precious foreign 
exchange (The Nation [Rangoon] November 10, 1955).
Such violence left a deep mark on people. Livelihoods 
were disrupted while residents were sometimes forced 
to take up arms, thereby inviting reprisals. The worst 
reprisals against forest dwellers occurred after 1962 as 
the tatmadaw killed, tortured and raped countless thou-
sands of villagers suspected of helping insurgents. Many 
thousands of villagers have been forced to do dangerous 
work on behalf of the military (Smith 1999; Global Wit-
ness 2003).
A counter-insurgency campaign known as Pya Ley Pya 
(“four cuts”) was at the core of this strategy. It targeted 
those who lived in or near to the forests and was de-
signed to deprive insurgents of access to food, funds, 
intelligence and recruits (Smith 1999). In military terms, 
this campaign enabled the tatmadaw to achieve a series 
of victories against opponents beginning in the Irrawaddy 
Delta in the 1960s. The Four Cuts campaign was subse-
quently extended to the Pegu Yoma with Operation Aung 
Soe Moe conducted between 1973 and 1975 when the 
last insurgents were cleared from there. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the campaign moved to northern and eastern 
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border areas where, again, military success was achieved 
(Smith 1999; Global Witness 2003) and teak was an im-
portant part of SLORC strategizing.
Anti-insurgency campaigns of this sort were not new 
– the British mounted similar “pacification” campaigns in 
the late nineteenth century (Aung-Thwin 1985). However, 
the sheer scale and brutality of the post-1962 campaign 
stands out with entire villages moved to “secure” sites. In 
these sites, strict surveillance was imposed while displaced 
villagers faced a brutal forced labour regime (Doherty and 
Nyein Han 1994; Fink 2001). Extreme violence was thus 
the norm (BCN and TNI 1999; Tucker 2001). This campaign 
has been accompanied by rampant timber extraction that 
is eliminating the country’s forests (Bryant 1997; Global 
Witness 2003).
The creation of spaces of confrontation and violent envi-
ronments full of despair and death, as with the case just 
described, has been integral to a wider set of processes: 
colonialism, nationalism, international relations, militari-
sation, and globalisation. They are seemingly part of the 
warp and woof of modern life. Yet, there is also scope 
for the analysis of more hopeful spatial patterns of hu-
man-environmental interaction, albeit still conditioned by 
complex political interests and calculations.
SPACES OF COOPERATION: NGO-GRASSROOTS DYNAMICS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Political ecology has increasingly paid attention to the 
study of spaces of cooperation in which actors seek to 
assert new management practices vis-à-vis the biophysical 
environment. Moving beyond standard accounts of peas-
ant resistance to landlords and the state, this work serves 
to emphasise how political strategizing in broad and flex-
ible “alternative” coalitions is common in environmental 
management in many parts of the developing world today 
(Escobar 2001).
A key aspect here has been the strategic partnership 
between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and lo-
cal “grassroots” organizations and movements. Yet the 
view that NGOs simply go into local communities as they 
choose and thereafter call the shots in that partnership 
is usually false – and represents a misunderstanding of 
power relations between these actors (Clark 1998; Bryant 
2005). Indeed, as the following case study of Philippine 
NGO efforts to work with local communities illustrates, 
spaces of cooperation need to be based on mutual respect 
and trust as well as careful negotiations over the purpose 
and conditions of cooperation.
Indeed, local community support for an NGO can never be 
taken for granted. Political, economic and cultural divi-
sions often render pan-community endeavors problematic. 
Other obstacles include local distrust, skepticism and hos-
tility towards outsiders. NGO practices designed in turn to 
overcome these hurdles and facilitate work in communities 
can be here labelled constructive engagement. This process 
involves a campaign to convince potential partners of the 
local utility of the NGO. Why should residents work with 
them? Can NGOs keep their promises? Will there be long-
term support to the community?
I relate two NGO experiences to address these questions. 
The first NGO is the Philippine Association for Intercultural 
Development (PAFID) – a small to medium size Manila-
based organisation (of between 20 and 40 employees) that 
has worked for more than three decades on indigenous 
people’s land and resource rights. Its experience with lo-
cal communities on Coron Island in northern Palawan is 
specifically assessed here. The second NGO is the Haribon 
Foundation – a medium sized organisation (around 40-60 
employees) that has been a leading environmental NGO 
in the Philippines since the 1970s. Its work with local 
residents at Mount Isarog in southern Luzon is considered 
briefly here.
The PAFID case illustrates how connections developed over 
time can lead to a durable relationship. The nature of the 
first contact is critical. In 1985, Coron Island barangay 
[district] councillor Rodolfo Aguilar approached PAFID af-
ter learning that it had helped another community to ob-
tain a government Community Forest Stewardship Agree-
ment (CFSA). Not perfect, this certificate seemed to be one 
means for islanders to repel unwanted development. The 
NGO was initially invited to Coron to explain the scheme. 
After much debate, a majority of residents supported the 
CFSA. With a letter of invitation from the Tagbanua (the 
local islanders), the NGO helped to create the Tagbanua 
Foundation of Coron Island (TFCI) and to prepare the CFSA 
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application. The combination of the award of the CFSA in 
1990, and the TFCI’s maturation under Aguilar, meant that 
residents were able to reduce local development intrusions 
(Jaravelo and Tolentino 1989; PAFID 1998).
Yet TFCI authority required constant assertion. PAFID 
helped develop a management plan plus taught residents 
how to cultivate cashews for the market. Outsiders, mean-
while, once more threatened local control. Businesses took 
tourists to the lakes, beaches and clan caves that were 
a source of income (edible bird nests), water, and burial 
site. Individuals with government connections felled trees 
in violation of the CFSA. Coron Island was proposed as 
a site for a European Union biodiversity conservation 
scheme with backing from the Department of Environ-
ment and natural Resources (DENR) and big NGOs such as 
Conservation International. Migrant fishers and even some 
community members used dynamite or sodium cyanide to 
catch fish thereby destroying coral reef.
Residents turned again to PAFID for help. The NGO had 
won kudos for helping to create the TFCI and to win the 
CFSA. Subsequent ties were further proof of local commit-
ment. This record was important in the organization’s next 
phase of local involvement in the mid-1990s. PAFID agreed 
to help out once a letter of invitation from the residents 
was received. The importance of such a letter to the NGO 
in building spaces of cooperation is not to be gainsaid. 
It provides staff with an effective response to charges of 
meddling by those angry with the NGO. The letter insulates 
it against intra-community division. It strengthens the or-
ganization in the eyes of donors. Finally, the letter makes 
the symbolic but important point that the community is 
formally in charge of joint projects thereby according that 
community respect. Politically astute, the letter of invita-
tion is also a testament to the reputation of an NGO such 
as PAFID.
If constructive engagement involves the generation of 
measurable outcomes, it is also about capacity build-
ing and knowledge dissemination. These processes may 
defy measurement but are important. Indeed, they can 
prompt changes in community perspectives with implica-
tions for social resistance and policy. PAFID involvement 
at Coron in the mid-1990s is illustrative here. In par-
ticular, confrontation over the EU-funded National Inte-
grated Protected Areas Programme (NIPAP) emphasized 
the multifaceted behind-the-scenes influence of PAFID 
vis-à-vis the Tagbanua. It also becomes clear how the 
creation of spaces of cooperation can gain momentum 
as NGO assistance becomes critical to local community 
management choices.
Residents were uncertain about the NIPAP. True, the 
scheme promised the protection of Coron Island. Yet 
suspicion of official initiatives left many uneasy. Could 
proponents be trusted to account for Tagbanua concerns? 
How would NIPAP affect existing practices? How might 
acceptance of NIPAP impact on other quests, notably the 
one for official recognition of ancestral domain? PAFID 
played a key role in assisting them here. It did so notably 
by helping the TFCI to prepare a NIPAP consultation held 
on the island in October 1996. The meeting was designed 
to explain the NIPAP to residents. That it turned out dif-
ferently was notably due to PAFID.
NGO employees were sceptical about NIPAP. They were 
familiar with it through work on the nearby island of Min-
doro where indigenous people had rejected the scheme for 
fear that designation would undermine ancestral claims 
(NIPAP 1996; Rood 1998). Hence, PAFID leader Dave De 
Vera advised the TFCI to compile a list of local practices for 
a Tagbanua Ancestral Law. He suggested this step would 
bolster community pride since the Law profiled Tagbanua 
skills even as it would be a basis for a Certificate of An-
cestral Domain Claim (CADC). The Law provided the TFCI 
with its own proposal to present at the consultation (TFCI 
1996; PAFID 1998).
The Law was prepared by the TFCI with PAFID assistance. 
The process involved distilling oral traditions into a written 
account of locally “sustainable” land and water manage-
ment. Logistical and intellectual support from PAFID was 
vital. A community organizer thus spent much of October 
doing this task. Not only did this employee transcribe the 
oral account into a manuscript. He also translated what 
was agreed into legal idiom amenable to official con-
sideration. Much depended therefore on this employee’s 
precision. Yet he was highly respected and trusted by a 
Tagbanua leadership accustomed to working with PAFID 
employees who “delivered the goods”.
Other staff came to help as the date of the meeting neared. 
That two experienced policy analysts as well as leader De 
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Vera turned up underscored the PAFID commitment. They 
assisted Belen and the TFCI with community validation 
of the Law and offered advice on strengthening it. They 
also made crucial interventions during the consultation 
itself. Thus, while the TFCI chaired the consultation, PAFID 
employees provided support from the sidelines. Prior to 
the start of the meeting, for example, De Vera met with 
the NIPAP leader to discuss Tagbanua problems with the 
NIPAP – especially the lack of local control of the proposed 
Protected Areas Management Board (PAMB) – and to as-
certain where NIPAP stood on this matter. Staff helped 
Aquilar thereafter to ensure that audience participation 
reflected concerns about the protected area. Above all, 
organizing work paid-off when the NIPAP team failed 
to intimidate the Tagbanua. Local self-confidence was 
especially demonstrated on the second day of the con-
sultation when the TFCI completed their critique of the 
NIPAP proposal and presented their own Ancestral Law 
without hitch.
What to make of PAFID’s role here? The NGO was central 
to the process of articulating a Tagbanua perspective. 
While the Ancestral Law reflected the views of the Taga-
banua, PAFID helped them to see how it could be used 
strategically to promote ancestral domain over the NIPAP 
scheme. Yet the stakes were high as it was suggested that 
the Tagbanua would “no longer” be poor if they accepted 
the latter. However, because they had faith in PAFID, they 
rejected such blandishments in favor of action suggested 
by the NGO.
Such trust reflected bonds of friendship developed with 
PAFID staff over the years. In the case of the commu-
nity organizer Ruel Belen, local acceptance was solidi-
fied through his residency on the Island. Yet acceptance 
reflected more than the activities of one employee. 
Various staff had visited Coron since 1985. Trust and 
friendship thus extended to others as well. This process 
also reflected a conscious effort: «our first activity was to 
establish immediate rapport with the community» (Jarav-
elo and Tolentino 1989: 1). This effort took various forms 
including sport. To nurture connections in this way was 
vital to constructive engagement between PAFID and the 
Tagbanua. Indeed, how staff conducted themselves with 
community members was often as important as what goals 
they achieved. This is not surprising since communities 
(like the Tagbanua) are beset by elites disdainful of them 
(Rood 1998; Lawrence 2002). Thus, to create spaces of 
cooperation requires, above all, respectful conduct on the 
part of NGOs to local partners.
The experience of the Haribon Foundation at Mount Isa-
rog in southern Luzon provides further evidence to this 
effect. It also alerts us to the manner in which constraints 
on an NGO can lead to the degradation of such a space. 
This NGO became involved in this region in 1989 when 
students working for Haribon did a survey of the local 
national park. Systematic work began when funding 
was obtained thereafter. Five barangay were selected 
for a conservation project based on criteria linked to 
human settlement in the park, extent of environmental 
destruction, road accessibility, provision of government 
services, and the peace and order situation (Communist 
insurgents were still locally active). Employees assigned 
to each barangay were responsible for community or-
ganizing, alternative livelihoods and research. Haribon 
entered these districts without a letter of invitation. 
Employees instead held “house-to-house conferences” 
where they introduced themselves and explained what 
biodiversity conservation was and why it was needed. 
They also set out the community-based management ap-
proach that they wished to see introduced. This method 
was labour-intensive but vital if the NGO was to connect 
with communities.
Local circumstances were not propitious since many com-
munities were dependent on illegal logging. As the leader 
of the Cawaynan people’s organization recalled, when the 
NGO arrived, people conducted «illegal logging, kaingin 
[shifting cultivation] and other forest extraction as a 
major source of livelihood» (Vale 1996). Members of local 
government were involved in illegal logging and bitterly 
opposed Haribon. While the NGO was able to organize in 
Cawaynan, the leaders of that people’s organization were 
thereafter locked «in conflict with the local government» 
(Vale 1996). In Panicuason, Haribon fared worse as local 
opposition torpedoed a people’s organization. Endemic 
poverty was also a factor. Many people were dependent 
on landlords who were indifferent to the Haribon message. 
In Lugsad, ninety percent of the 160 families were tenants 
growing crops such as sugarcane who were also reliant 
on forest extraction – there was little room for maneuver 
here. Appeals to them of the merits of conservation thus 
fell on deaf ears at first.
ARBOR CLXXXIV 729 enero-febrero [2008] 5-17 ISSN: 0210-1963
729Nº
14
TH
E P
O
LITICA
L EC
O
LO
G
Y O
F EN
VIR
O
N
M
EN
TA
L M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T IN
 TH
E D
EVELO
P
IN
G
 W
O
R
LD
Progress was still made. People’s organizations were cre-
ated with each organization comprising between twenty 
and thirty members. These organizations bore the stamp 
of the NGO inasmuch as they were identically structured 
via committees. Soon, the day-to-day activities of the 
committees reflected the input of residents keen to ad-
vance their interests through the new institutions. Here 
too, Haribon was vital. Its staff provided leadership train-
ing and accountancy skills to enable the organizations to 
function. They offered para-legal training to facilitate the 
fight against loggers even as employees taught ecology 
and agroforestry to promote alternative livelihoods.
Haribon earned local respect through these activities. The 
manner in which Haribon entered the community was im-
portant since house-to-house conferences helped employ-
ees learn about local concerns in a respectful manner. The 
alternative livelihood scheme in particular signaled that 
the NGO understood the need to combine talk of conserva-
tion with practical steps to promote livelihoods. The focus 
was on agroforestry with each people’s organization given 
funds to develop seed nurseries and demonstration farms. 
The nurseries would increase the supply of woody and 
fruit tree species so that people involved in logging could 
safely abandon that practice. The farms would do likewise 
but would also illustrate sustainable farming methods 
designed to appeal to tenants and landlords.
Yet the scheme had a negligible impact on livelihoods. Bad 
luck was partly to blame as a typhoon ripped through the 
area destroying seedlings and devastating crops. Still, the 
modest nature of the scheme meant that it could only ever 
have a minor impact. On the one hand, there was “easy 
money” from logging. As one resident observed, «if the 
project can guarantee livelihood [in contrast to logging] 
I support it but I doubt it» (Riipinen 1995: 55). On the 
other hand, there was ongoing dependency on landlords. 
The head of the Lugsad people’s organization had to clear 
forest owned by his landlord for a sugarcane plantation 
but could not challenge him for fear of dismissal (Perez 
1996).
Haribon still won local support. In Lugsad, residents ap-
preciated the provision of education on sustainable farm-
ing and agroforestry. One participant explained, «I have 
learned much on new planting techniques and forest 
conservation through this project» (cited in Riipinen 1995: 
54). The leader of the Cawaynan people’s organization re-
flected a general view in observing that residents «now 
understood the value of protecting their forest» against 
clear felling it for immediate gain thanks to the hard work 
of Haribon staff (Vale 1996). On the one side, there was a 
recognition that valuable biodiversity was being lost. On 
the other, there was the prospect of new economic activi-
ties predicated on in situ conservation. Recognition of the 
virtues of the project was summarized by a villager: «This 
does not help us to change everything but it helps us to 
get some more income to the organization, and through 
this we can get some benefits to us, as well as to the 
environment» (in Riipinen 1995: 53-54).
Haribon earned kudos by joint action against illegal loggers 
– a dangerous practice that risked violence. Yet such action 
was an «integral part of Haribon’s work» (Luna 1996). Staff 
helped the Lugsad organization, for example, to erect a 
human barricade across a road used by loggers. This move 
stopped a shipment and thereafter greatly reduced local 
logging. Success also gave an enormous boost to the peo-
ple’s organization since it seemingly demonstrated their 
power. Finally, it was a boon to Haribon, as it demonstrated 
the value of its work and a willingness to show solidarity 
with local partners even under duress.
These interventions did not win the battle against illegal 
logging at Mount Isarog. Their cumulative effect, though, 
did contribute to its decline. Reporters noted this impact in 
assessing Haribon’s role. Thus, Doris Gaskell Nuyda (1997) 
writing in the Philippine Daily Inquirer described the fall in 
logging as a “success story” in the national environmental 
battle in which local groups “contained” the threat with 
firm support from Haribon.
Yet Mount Isarog was no clear-cut success for Haribon. 
Funding was a headache. Thus, the NGO suffered a severe 
budget cut locally in 1994 that led to the loss of eight 
of ten project employees. Project success was jeopardized 
since, as project officer Noel Resurrecion (1996) observed, 
they «pulled out too soon» from the communities. While 
external forces were to blame, the pullout nonetheless 
generated tension between staff and local organizations. 
One local leader (anonymously) explained that he and his 
colleagues experienced difficulty «ever since the Haribon 
Foundation has left them on their own». Indeed, he added, 
it had «left them too early» as they were not ready «to take 
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organizational responsibilities all by themselves». There 
was resentment too that only six months notice was given 
and no extension was granted despite local appeals.
There were knock-on effects. The pullout triggered a 
decline in local interest in the people’s organization as 
residents had looked to Haribon for guidance. True, the 
impact varied between barangay. In Lugsad, the people’s 
organization flourished since a new micro-finance project 
was initiated with Haribon assistance. Also, this group 
enjoyed strong leadership from residents who doubled as 
district officials. That said, even here, there were “organi-
zational problems” following the pullout.
Haribon staff worked hard to contain the fallout that was 
apparently damaging this space of cooperation. They knew 
that their name was sullied even though they were not 
to blame for the budget cuts. However, NGOs often face 
local frustration at such times due to an expectation that 
staff can fix problems (Alegre 1996; Fowler 1997). Hari-
bon thus pursued several avenues to repair the damage. 
They persuaded the four people’s organizations to form an 
umbrella group, the Anduyog Federation, to fill the gap 
left by Haribon even as staff helped it to win funding. A 
micro-lending project was followed by a capacity building 
grant from the Foundation for the Philippine Environment 
related to community organizing, seed propagation, lob-
bying and fundraising. These actions softened the blow of 
the pullout. They also underscored Haribon’s ongoing com-
mitment to local partners even in the face of budget cuts. 
Representatives of the local groups, meanwhile, sought 
to understand the situation and make do under the new 
circumstances.
As the Haribon experience in particular suggests, con-
structive engagement is not an easy process. Community 
support must be constantly earned through interaction in 
which NGOs demonstrate competency and solidarity. This 
is not straightforward even under ideal conditions. Support 
often wanes when NGOs do not keep promises. As such, 
the ability not only to create but thereafter to maintain 
spaces of cooperation requires great skill as links must be 
continuously cultivated and trust perpetually reinforced.
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL ECOLOGY TRANSACTIONS
This paper has drawn on two case studies (both drawn 
from South-East Asia) in order to explore selected aspects 
of the political ecology of environmental management in 
the developing world. There is, of course, no attempt in 
this paper at being “representative” of the sorts of issues 
and problems that shape such management. That would 
indeed be a hopeless task in such a vast and variegated 
area as the “developing world”. Nonetheless, I have sought 
to draw out at least some of the dynamics and implications 
of such management, at least when seen from a political 
ecology perspective.
Specifically, I have explored environmental management 
in the developing world analytically in terms of “spaces of 
confrontation” and “spaces of cooperation”. This approach 
to a vast topic enables us to pinpoint how unequal power 
relations – which are a core concern of political ecology 
– relate to the spatial behaviour of actors, notably through 
the creation of geographies of despair and hope. Clearly, 
these geographies change over time and are, in any case, 
perceived differently by different actors. This is to say that 
environmental management is inescapably political – the 
great drama of human life on Earth is, after all, a drama 
long preoccupied with conflict and cooperation over how 
to manage the environment and even more crucially who is 
to do so. For those who work towards a more “sustainable” 
future for human-environmental interaction, therefore, 
political understanding and engagement is an essential 
prerequisite for effective action. In the process, a messy 
and multifaceted politics of transaction is unavoidable.
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